several empirical studies have shown that the rise of flexible work is not linked to a growth in productivity. 6 It is precisely from such argument in favour of 'flexibility for growth' that -along with the 'security' corrective -the well-known flexicurity paradigm has developed in the past years. This central but quite indeterminate concept, which seeks, as its name suggests, to combine flexibility and security (in their respective and various forms), has been adopted as the guiding labour market policy for the European Union at least since the 2006 Green Paper of the European Commission, 7 although it was already present in the previous guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States after the launch of the European Employment Strategy in 1997. 8 As we know, even during the global economic crisis both the Commission and the Council of the EU have confirmed their commitment to flexicurity, maintaining the position that such a formula should be the basis for EU employment policy, although European policymakers have interpreted it differently over the years. 9 Nevertheless, many have asked whether this difficult balance between flexibility and security can in actual fact be disproportionate, always emphasising the former over the latter: some have even given voice to a kind of 'requiem for flexicurity ', 10 referring to the premature 'aging' and decay of that paradigm. To simply state that more forms of non-standard work equal more and better jobs and greater social cohesion is doubtless wrong and can foster a bad enterprise attitude which seeks margins of competitiveness betting especially on work devaluation. Such doubts and objections, however, have had no effect on the dogmas of the European employment policies, which, in essence, have not changed. issue can be the subject-matter for both an Open Method of Coordination procedure and a harmonisation Directive, albeit in the 'soft' version -as in the case of fixed-term work -of a Framework Agreement. This could produce an overlap between these two different instruments of regulation and governance, thereby entailing a compound of the traditional purposes of social policy measures (granting minimum standard rights to workers) and rationales for employment policy (promoting job creation).
In this respect, reading the texts of the atypical work Directives, one can say that they all follow the aim of flexicurity, expressly acknowledging the purpose of achieving the required balance between flexibility and security. Despite this there are some differences between them:
while both the Part-Time Work Directive and the Agency Work Directive contain a provision requiring state or social partners to review prohibitions or restrictions to these forms of work, there is nothing equivalent in the Fixed-Term Work Directive which refrains from promoting fixed-term work and, on the contrary, states that 'contracts of an indefinite duration are, and will continue to be, the general form of employment relationship between employers and workers'.
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Regardless of this last affirmation, the Fixed-Term Work Directive has been consideredboth just after its adoption and later -as 'latently permissive', having the effect of 'normalising' 13 this form of atypical work and tacitly encouraging deregulation in the Member States or anyway as being incapable of preventing it. 14 This Directive however -in the extremely deregulated labour markets resulting from the national structural reforms adopted all over Europe in response to the economic crisis (and on the pretext thereof) -could prove to be a quite valuable protective instrument against further deregulation.
The EUCJ's guardian function in the name of the principle of effectiveness
Focusing on the primary source of regulation of fixed-term work, i.e. Directive 1999/70, we should start from its double purpose, that is, as stated in Clause 1 of the Framework Agreement, to
'improve the quality of fixed-term work by ensuring the application of the principle of nondiscrimination' and to 'establish a framework to prevent abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships'. It is in the light of those purposes that the clauses of the Agreement have to be interpreted, and this is particularly true in the case of two fundamental provisions which are closely interrelated and implement together the abovementioned balance: these are Clause 4, which requires that, 'in respect of employment conditions, fixed-term 12 See Preamble and General Considerations no. 6. 13 instructions coming from the EUCJ's case law in the name of the principle of effectiveness -it is certainly helpful to repeat and mark how the value of employment stability is underpinned in the Directive. 18 By stressing the importance of the Preamble and of the General Considerations of the Agreement, the EUCJ has repeatedly held that the Agreement 'proceeds on the premise that employment contracts of indefinite duration are the general form of employment relationship', since they contribute to the quality of life of the workers concerned and improve their performance, highlighting its aim of protecting workers 'against instability of employment'. 19 Still recently, in confirmed that the benefit of stable employment is held to be a major element in the protection of workers, whereas it is only in certain circumstances that fixed-term employment contracts are liable to respond to the needs of both employers and workers. 20 Another good example of this approach is
Huet, where the Court of Justice -in response to the case of a French lecturer whose fixed-term contract was converted to a permanent contract after a certain period of time -ruled that, if a Member State were to permit the conversion to be accompanied by material amendments to the principal clauses of the previous contract in a way that was fundamentally unfavourable to the employee, with the employee's tasks and the nature of his functions remaining unchanged, 'it is not inconceivable that that employee might be deterred from entering into the new contract offered to him, thereby losing the benefit of stable employment, viewed as a major element in the protection of workers'. 21 The Court thus emphasised, by speaking the language of social policy, that 'the aim of the Agreement is that of avoiding, or at least reducing, the risks related to the instability of employment and that of protecting job security tout court' 22 : to put it briefly, the Luxembourg judges wanted to promote 'the Community legislature's intention to make stable employment a prime objective as regards labour relations within the European Union'. The pathway that led to this not yet dormant development of the non-discrimination rule began with two important judgments that continue to be the basis of the settled line of reasoning of the Court.
Starting with Del Cerro Alonso (regarding fixed-term workers in the Spanish health service who were not considered eligible for salary allowances linked to length of service, reserved under national law solely to permanent staff), the Court took a first important step and affirmed that the principle of equal treatment is a rule of EU social law of particular importance and cannot be interpreted restrictively; the concept of 'employment conditions' referred to in Clause 4 should therefore also include remuneration of fixed-term workers.
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Once again it was a not completely obvious outcome, as illustrated by the fact that Advocate
General had suggested a far more restricted concept of 'employment conditions', which did not extend to pay, interpreting the absence of any reference to remuneration in Directive 1999/70 'as an express intention to exclude it from its scope' and arguing that another interpretation would have been liable to render meaningless Article 137.5 EC (now 153.5 TFEU), which does not authorise the Council to adopt measures relating to pay. 48 The Advocate's Opinion was firmly rejected by the Court, which has considered pay as the first and most important condition of employment. 44 In O'Brien (para. 38) the Court underlined that the definition of 'worker' has 'an effect on the scope and effectiveness of the principle of equal treatment enshrined in that Agreement'. See Robin-Olivier S., ' 46 Adding that the principle of pro rata temporis shall apply only «where appropriate». We must underline that Clause 4 does not refer to the concepts of direct or indirect discrimination and has a rather «unusual construction» if compared to the concept of discrimination within EU anti-discrimination legislation: the first part of the clause, with the wording about discrimination depending solely on fixed-term work, «brings direct discrimination to mind, while the second part, introducing the possibility of justifying different treatment with reference to objective grounds, is similar to the regulation of indirect discrimination» (Petterson H. Impact, however, is to be viewed as a fundamental 'second step' of the Court because it marked another major strength of this key principle, namely its capacity to be directly effective within national courts 56 : the Court definitely affirmed that Clause 4 appears to be unconditional and sufficiently precise for individuals to be able to rely upon it against the State, particularly in its capacity as an employer, before a national court, 57 which must set aside any discriminatory provision of national law, without having to request or await its prior removal by the legislature, and apply to members of the disadvantaged group the same arrangements as those enjoyed by persons within the other category. With regard to this power of the national court -even though this is clearly too complex an issue for us to address here -it remains to be seen whether, although the EUCJ has so far addressed only cases of unequal treatment of non-standard workers in the public sector in which the direct vertical effect of the equality clause may be deployed, the national court can set aside the domestic law even if the employer involved is a private sector employer. 60 We are, in actual fact, faced with a multifaceted issue about which the EUCJ's case law is raising many further questions, which the Court will certainly be invited to answer in future.
One more point to highlight has to do with the relatively strict interpretation that the Court has offered of the concept of 'objective grounds' which, according to Clause 4.1. of the Agreement, can justify different treatment for fixed-term workers as compared to permanent workers. The Court aimed at minimising the permissibility of differences, in order not to render meaningless the equal treatment principle. In Del Cerro Alonso the Court submitted -relying on the case law interpreting the concept of 'objective reasons' which, according to Clause 5.1.a of the Agreement, justify the renewal of fixed-term contracts -that this concept must be understood as not permitting a difference in treatment to be justified 'on the basis that the difference is provided for by a general, abstract national norm, such as a law or collective agreement'. More precisely the Court required that the unequal treatment is to be justified 'by the existence of precise and concrete factors, characterising the employment condition to which it relates, in the specific context in which it occurs and on the basis of objective and transparent criteria', in order to ensure -in accordance with the test laid down in discrimination law -that 'the unequal treatment in fact responds to a genuine need, is appropriate for achieving the objective pursued and is necessary for that purpose'.
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It is thus impossible to objectively justify a difference in treatment either purely because a national law or a collective agreement says so or -as the Court ruled in Gavieiro and repeated on several occasions -merely because of the temporary nature of an employment relationship, taking into consideration that the reliance on such a criterion would render meaningless the objectives of the identification of an inequality implies a more global comparison between the situations involved. In Carratù, for instance, the compensation paid for the unlawful insertion of a fixed-term clause into an employment contract and that applicable to the termination of an employment contract of indefinite duration related -according to a slightly hasty assessment by the EUCJ -to workers who could not be regarded as being in a comparable condition: the situations in which these types of compensation were paid have been considered significantly different, because the former related to workers whose employment contract was concluded unlawfully, whereas the latter related to employees who had been dismissed.
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One potential risk of this system is that the Court's use of the comparator test 'acts as a filtering mechanism' 76 against workers whose contractual status is particularly precarious: in contract (a 'zero-hours contract') from the benefit of the principle of equal treatment, stating that there was no comparability between these workers and those employed full-time. 77 Quite recently, in partial derogation from that judgment, the Court adopted a more substantive approach on this matter: it clarified -in the abovementioned O'Brien, regarding the peculiar situation of part-time judges remunerated on a fee-paid basis who, unlike full-time judges and part-time salaried judges, are not entitled to a retirement pension -that the criteria for defining a comparable full-time worker 'are based on the content of the activity of the persons concerned' and identified as the 'crucial factor' of this check the requirement of investigating into whether they 'perform essentially the same activity'.
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What the Court avoided doing in O'Brien -but might do in the future -is to examine whether the Directive precludes discrimination between different kinds of part-time employment.
This was extensively discussed in the Advocate-General's Opinion, 79 postal sector: there, the Court held that a principle of equal treatment between different categories of fixed-term workers cannot be inferred from the general principle of non-discrimination, since such a principle would need to be specified by an act of EU secondary legislation. 83 . The Court will soon have the opportunity to return to this issue thanks to a Spanish request for a preliminary ruling regarding the exclusion of a category of temporary replacement workers from the entitlement to receive compensation on termination of contract.
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It should also be noted that the possible obstacle of the comparator test and the Court's refusal, at present, to make a comparison between different types of non-standard workers might in some cases be overcome by appealing to anti-discrimination law. Regarding this matter we cannot indeed overlook the fact that 'inequalities linked to gender and age (in particular) are reflected in the demographic profile of atypical workers' 85 (see also Conclusions). Either the bargaining origin of the Agreement or the difficulties encountered during the negotiations between the European social partners in order to find a mediation between different positions (and different models of regulating fixed-term work in the national legal systems) 89 are reflected, as it is well known, in the wording and in the 'soft' contents of the Agreement. 90 In particular Clause 5 assigns to the Member States the general objective of preventing and punishing abuse, while leaving open the issue of the means whereby they are to achieve this. 91 More precisely, Clause 5 leaves the Member States to decide, although with some limits, whether they should rely on one or more of the measures listed in that clause, or even on existing equivalent legal measures, while taking into account the needs of specific sectors and/or categories of workers, thus favouring the need to adapt the rules to the specific national situations: that choice of means involves that Clause 5 cannot have direct effect, because 'it does not appear to be unconditional and sufficiently precise for individuals to be able to rely upon it before a national court', Again, with reference to temporary needs of employers -and in particular to temporary replacements due to employee sick leave, maternity or parental leave at issue in the German case
The second pillar of the protection: the need to introduce measures to prevent and punish abuse
Kücük -the Court of Justice passed a rather contradictory judgment in 2012. 105 The EUCJ, on the one hand, argued that 'the mere fact that fixed-term employment contracts are concluded in order to cover an employer's permanent or recurring need for replacement staff does not in itself suffice to rule out the possibility that each of those contracts, viewed individually, was concluded in order to ensure a temporary replacement', 106 showing doubtless a certain tolerance towards the repetition of contract renewals for replacement; 107 on the other hand, the Court invited the referring judges to assess the circumstances surrounding these renewals, in particular taking into account the number and duration of successive fixed-term contracts concluded with the same person or for the purposes of performing the same work, in order to ensure that fixed-term contracts are not abused in practice by employers.
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There exists -and this aspect should not be underestimated -a good margin of action for the national court, as illustrated by the far less tolerant answer of the referring court (in the case in point the Bundesarbeitsgericht) once the preliminary ruling was complete: the German Supreme Court, in the resumption judgment, identified a contractual abuse as fraud and referred it to the District Court.
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This quite ambiguous line of reasoning on the part of the EUCJ was better developed in that temporary contracts 'cannot be renewed for the purpose of the performance in a fixed and permanent manner, even on a part-time basis, of teaching tasks which normally come under the activity of the ordinary teaching staff', giving to all the authorities of the Member State concerned the task of ascertaining in actual fact that the renewal of successive fixed-term contracts is intended to cover temporary needs and that the provision at issue is not, in fact, being used to meet fixed and permanent needs of the universities in terms of employment of teaching staff. 
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More recently, in 2014, the Court again addressed the same issue in Fiamingo: this time dealing with the Italian legislation on workers employed as seafarers, whereby only fixed-term contracts separated by a time lapse of less than or equal to 60 days are considered to be 'successive'. The Court maintained that 'such a lapse of time may generally be considered to be sufficient to interrupt any existing employment relationship and to have the effect that any contract signed after that time is not considered to be successive', adding significantly that 'it would seem difficult for an employer, who has permanent and lasting requirements, to circumvent the protection against abuse by allowing a period of about two months to elapse following the end of every fixedterm employment contract'. 117 The Court then emphasised once more the national judge's task of making sure that 'the conditions of application and the effective implementation of that legislation result in a measure that is adequate to prevent and punish the misuse of successive fixed-term employment contracts' 118 : a task that domestic judges have to perform in accordance with the same tested 'indicators' already provided to the referring judges to fulfill their assessment on the existence of objective reasons justifying the renewal of successive contracts. 119 Even in this case, as in Kücük, the referring court (the Italian Corte di Cassazione) responded with quite a strict judgment, submitting that the presence of a legislation in abstract terms capable of preventing abuse does not exclude the fact that, concretely, the exercise of the power to hire fixed-term workers can integrate fraud of the law, and then referring this assessment to the court dealing with the substance of the case. To sum up, all these judgments interpreting Clause 5 appear to point to the willingness of the Court, on the whole, to render as effective as possible provisions which are not detailed and on A different solution, which appears to be more satisfactory, was provided by the Court in 2013 with the Papalia order, concerning the compensation to be acknowledged to a worker recruited by a public body on successive fixed-term contracts for a period of 30 years. Here the Court took the domestic dispute seriously and assessed this ruling in the light of the complex interpretation of the national law made by the referring court, according to which for a public sector worker it would be impossible in practice, or excessively difficult, to provide the proof required by the law in order to obtain such compensation for damages, being required to 'prove that he was forced to forego better work opportunities' 136 and to prove the loss of profits. The Court has in essence assessed as conflicting with EU law a burden of proof system that constitutes a concrete obstacle for the workers to the exercise of the rights conferred by that law, in the name of the principle of effectiveness and more specifically in terms of effective judicial protection. We should find out in the near future how national judges -again playing a fundamental role in the enforcement of EU law -will react to this order 137 .
Through this jurisprudence, in conclusion, the Court of Justice has progressively shifted the emphasis onto the requirement of effectiveness of remedies, so that the principle of effective judicial protection can be seen as a further relevant component -for present purposes -of the European model for fixed-term work, in defence of the enforcement of EU law.
138

Conclusions
In the light of what has been argued in this article, it can be maintained that the principle of effectiveness is ubiquitous and transversal, a kind of fil rouge, in all the case law analysed. The
Court of Justice has elevated that principle to the extent that it has become an interpretative key to used by the Court, as discussed previously, the principle of equal treatment has been described as 'a rule of EU social law of particular importance', 'a principle of Community social law' and 'a fundamental objective ' . 142 Yet it should be noted that the Court, with some caution, has avoided any explicit reference to equal treatment as a fundamental social right and we must take into account the fact that existing European and international sources did not expressly recognise equality of treatment between standard and atypical workers as a fundamental social right. law on this matter, which are merging as increasingly aligned to those achieved in the general antidiscrimination field, one might wonder whether (and hope that) a further and more creative evolution of the fixed-term work case-law in the wake of the general anti-discrimination case law could occur; and it would be certainly useful in improving the practical effectiveness of the protection of non-standard workers.
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Secondly, as mentioned above, the possibility to invoke the indirect discrimination argument if a fixed-term worker falls within a disadvantaged group on personal grounds, protected by antidiscrimination rules, should be also assessed in some circumstances, since, for example, young workers are over-represented in temporary employment, the prohibition of age discrimination under the Framework Equality Directive (Directive 2000/78) might also lead to a requirement to provide equal treatment to fixed-term workers, according to the same mechanism used, in the 1980s and 1990s, by a kind of 'oblique' EUCJ case law 144 which, as it is well known, gave significant results in terms of workers' protection (above all women's protection). 145 This possibility has been recently in compliance with the model outlined above, will certainly be guided by the key principle of effectiveness, which implies the fundamental national judges' task to always make sure that the conditions of application and the effective implementation of the domestic legislation result in a measure -concluding, as we started, by borrowing the Court's words -'that is adequate to prevent and punish the misuse of successive fixed-term employment contracts'. 
